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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Suzana Marie Connor entered a conditional guilty plea to felony DUI, preserving her
right to appeal the denial of her motion to extend the time for her to file a motion to suppress.
Ms. Connor asserts that the district court erred by denying her motion to extend time for her to
file suppression motions, where she demonstrated good cause and excusable neglect. In this
case, Ms. Connor sought suppression because her blood was forcibly drawn from her body
absent her consent and absent a warrant. Ms. Connor demonstrated good cause and excusable
neglect where the Idaho Supreme Court had recently determined that a forced blood draw was
unconstitutional. This Court should vacate Ms. Connor's judgment of conviction and the order
denying the motion to file a motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court so that
Ms. Connor may file a motion to suppress and the court may consider the motion on its merits.
Alternatively, Ms. Connor contends that her sentence of ten years, with two years fixed,
represents an abuse of the district court's discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the
facts. She further contends that the district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce her
sentence in light of the additional information submitted in conjunction with her Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion and failed to consider relevant information presented in
support of her Rule 35 motion.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On June 4, 2012, at approximately 6:30 in the morning, officers were dispatched to a gas
station. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3; Supp. R., 1 p.165.) One of the
gas station employees reported that a woman was in the gas station asking for a ride, and she was
believed to be intoxicated. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Her car was parked in the gas station parking area.
(PSI, p.3.) Officer Moore spoke to Ms. Connor who said that the car belonged to her husband
and that he had walked somewhere else after driving to the gas station. (PSI, p.3.) Ms. Connor
was arrested for suspicion of DUI. (PSI, p.3.) Ms. Connor refused to perform field sobriety
testing and refused to blow into the breathalyzer. (PSI, pp.3-4.) She was taken to the jail and
blood was forcibly extracted from her arm. 2 (PSI, p.3; Supp. R., p.165.) Ms. Connor's blood
alcohol content was .292. (PSI, p.4.) Ms. Connor had twice been convicted of felony DUI, in
1999 and in 2006. (PSI, pp.11-12.)
Based on these facts, the State filed an Information on October 4, 2012, which alleged
that Ms. Connor committed felony DUI. (R., pp.43-44.) Ms. Connor was arraigned and pleaded
not guilty on October 16, 2012. (R., pp.49-50.) A jury trial was set for February 27, 2013.
(R., pp.56-59.) The State moved to amend the Information to allege a Part II persistent violator
sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.62-63.) The State's motion was set to be heard on January 15,
2013. (R., pp.64-65.) The motion was not set during a hearing; therefore, Ms. Connor was not
present when the district court announced the hearing date. (1/14/19 Tr., p.17, L.23 - p.18,
L.12.) Ms. Connor did not appear for the hearing, and a warrant was issued on January 31, 2013.

1

The prior record in Ms. Connor's earlier appeal (No. 41489-2013) was augmented with
documents filed after 2013. (Supp. R., p.2.) The augmented portion of the record shall
hereinafter be referred to as the "Supplemental Record" or "Supp. R."
2

(R., pp.66-70.) The surety bond was forfeited. (R., p.71.) Big Dawg Bail Bonds moved to set
aside the bond forfeiture and exonerate the bond.

(R., pp.72-75, 90-95.) The district court

denied the motion, in part, by only partially exonerating the bond, and counsel for Big Dawg
Bail Bonds filed a timely notice of appeal on October 7, 2013. (R., pp.98-106, 110-124.) On
September 29, 2014, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision in State v.
Big Dawg Bail Bonds, 157 Idaho 373 (Ct. App. 2014).

Ms. Connor was arrested in Oregon in August of2018. 3 (Supp. R., p.20.) On August 21,
2018, the district court held a status conference and set the matter for a jury trial to begin on
January 28, 2019. (Supp. R., pp.36-39.) The district court's order did not include any deadlines
for the filing of motions pursuant to I.C.R. 12. (Supp. R., pp.36-37.) On September 6, 2018,
Ms. Connor filed a Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress.

(Supp.

R., pp.40-43.) She asserted that the evidence gathered against her should be suppressed because
her blood was drawn against her will-she revoked her implied consent and the officers did not
obtain a warrant before forcibly drawing her blood. (Supp. R., pp.40-43.) The State objected
and asserted that, for the motion to be timely, it was required to be filed no later than 28 days
after the "not guilty" plea was entered, in this case, by December 11, 2012. (Supp. R., pp.72-75.)
The State asserted that Ms. Connor failed to appear on January 15, 2013-thirty-five days after
the deadline had passed. (Supp. R., pp.73-74.) The State claimed that Ms. Conner had not
shown good cause or excusable neglect to extend the filing deadline for I.C.R. 12 motions.
(Supp. R., p.74.)

2

Ms. Connor told the presentencing investigator that the blood sample was contaminated-the
person performing the blood draw used over-saturated alcohol wipes prior to drawing her blood.
(PSI, p.5.) Ms. Conner stated the alcohol was "dripping down my arm." (PSI, p.5.)
3
Ms. Connor had been living abroad for several years. (PSI, pp.16-18.)
3

A hearing was held on Ms. Connor's motion. (Supp. R., pp.51-54; 1/14/19 Tr.) The
parties did not dispute the basis for Ms. Connor's motion-her blood was forcefully drawn
absent consent or a warrant. (Supp. R., pp.42, 73.) At the hearing, the district court found
Ms. Connor's motion to suppress was untimely filed, and no good cause or excusable neglect
warranted extending the time. (Supp. R., pp.68-74.) The district court assumed for purposes of
the motion to enlarge time that Ms. Connor's blood was drawn without her consent, but did not
address the merits of the suppression motion and did not hear evidence or testimony regarding
the circumstances under which Ms. Connor's blood was forcibly drawn.

4

(1/14/19 Tr., p.16,

L.25 - p.17, Ls.14.)
The district court denied Ms. Connor's motion to enlarge the time to file a motion to
suppress, fmding that the motion was filed 1,267 days late and neither good cause nor excusable
neglect excused the late filing. (Supp. R., pp.108-27.)
Ms. Connor entered a conditional guilty plea.

(Supp. R., pp.133-37.)

Ms. Connor

preserved her right to appeal the denial of the motion to enlarge the time to file a motion to
suppress. 5 (1/29/19 Tr., p.36, L.23 - p.40, L.20; p.50, L.4 - p.53, L.16; Supp. R., pp.136-37.)
Ms. Connor pled guilty to felony DUI and, pursuant to a plea agreement, the State agreed to
dismiss the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (1/29/19 Tr., p.40, L.20 - p.41, L.5;
R., pp.133-46.)

4

Since the district court's decision, but while Ms. Connor's case was pending on appeal, the
Idaho Supreme Court decided State v. Clarke, 165 Idaho 393 (2019). In Clarke, the Court held
that Mr. Clarke's arrest for misdemeanor battery committed outside the presence of law
enforcement was in violation of the Idaho Constitution. Based upon the facts of her case,
Ms. Connor may have an additional basis for suppression.
5
At the change of plea hearing, the district court clarified that its order denying Ms. Connor
permission to file a late motion to suppress applied to the suppression of the blood draw as well
as any other basis for suppression. ( 1/29/19 Tr., p.48, L.16 - p.49, L.11.)
4

At Ms. Connor's sentencing hearing, the State asked the district court to sentence
Ms. Connor to a term often years, with two and one-half years fixed. (3/19/19 Tr., p.77, Ls.1020.) The defense asked the court to place Ms. Connor on probation. (3/19/19 Tr., p.82, Ls.1719.) The district court sentenced Ms. Connor to a term often years, with two and one-half years
fixed. 6 (3/19/19 Tr., p.99, L.24 - p.100. L.4; Supp. R., pp.154-158.) Ms. Connor filed a timely
Notice of Appeal. (Supp. R., pp.166-173, 185-189; Aug., pp.27-31.)
Thereafter, Ms. Conner filed a timely motion seeking credit for time served and for
leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35(a-b). (Aug., pp.1-9.) She initially submitted information with her
Rule 35 motion which detailed inconsistencies in her GAIN assessments and documents showing
that she is a good candidate for probation or a rider.

(Aug., pp.1-9.)

Two weeks later,

Ms. Connor submitted additional supplemental information in support of her motions
documenting her health conditions, her positive behavior while incarcerated, and her completion
ofa self-improvement class. (Aug., pp.11-20.) On August 30, 2019, the district court denied the
motions without a hearing. (Aug., pp.21-26.)

6

There appears to be a clerical error in the Judgment of Conviction. (Supp. R., p.154.) The
Judgment reflects that Ms. Connor pied guilty to both the felony DUI and the persistent violator
sentencing enhancement; however, the enhancement was either dismissed or never filed pursuant
to the plea agreement. (3/19/19 Tr., p.61, Ls14-24.)
5

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Connor's motion to enlarge time to file
suppression motions?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten years,
with two and one-half years fixed, upon Ms. Connor following her plea of guilty to
felony DUI?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Connor's Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 Motion?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Denying Ms. Connor's Motion To Enlarge Time To File Suppression
Motions
A.

Introduction
Ms. Connor did not file her motion to suppress within the time limit designated by I.C.R.

12(d). Ms. Connor acknowledges that she was voluntarily absent from the State of Idaho for
approximately five years. However, while she was gone, the Idaho Supreme Court decided a
case which held that a forced blood draw absent a warrant was unconstitutional. Ms. Connor
asserts that the change in the law making unconstitutional a warrantless blood draw applied
directly to her case, and thus, good cause existed for enlarging the time for moving to suppress
the evidence collected as the result of unlawful police action.

Ms. Connor asserts that the

application of a procedural rule should not defeat her ability to address a clear constitutional
violation. Ms. Connor asserts that the district court failed to reach its decision by an exercise of
reason and acted inconsistently with applicable law, when it denied her motion to enlarge the
time for her to file suppression motions.

B.

Relevant Rules And Standard Of Review
Idaho Criminal Rule 12 governs the filings of pre-trial pleadings and motions, generally,

and motions to suppress evidence, specifically.

I.C.R. 12(b)(3). Rule 12(d) governs the

timelines for filing such motions and reads as follows:
Motions under Rule 12(b) must be filed within 28 days after the entry of a plea of
not guilty or seven days before trial whichever is earlier. In felony cases, motions
under 12(b) must be brought on for hearing within 14 days after filing or 48 hours
before trial, whichever is earlier. The court may shorten or enlarge the time and,
for good cause shown or for excusable neglect, may relieve a party offailure to
comply with this rule.

7

I.C.R. 12(d) (emphasis added). The burden of showing good cause or excusable neglect is on the
party who has missed the prescribed deadline. State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586, 591 (Ct. App.
1997). The power to extend or shorten the required time under I.C.R. 12(d) is discretionary.
State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888 (1985). When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on

appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry with four factors:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). Constitutional claims are reviewed de
novo. State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 218 (2014).

C.

The District Court Erred In Denying Ms. Connor's Motion To Enlarge Time To File A
Motion To Suppress Where Ms. Connor Demonstrated Good Cause Or Excusable
Neglect
A district court can consider a late-filed motion, even with a busy calendar, if it finds

good cause or excusable neglect for the late filing. See State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888
(1985); State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 597 (Ct. App. 1994). As explained by the Court of Appeals
in Dice in addressing a late-filed motion to suppress:
The district court should have entertained an explanation by [defense] counsel for
the delay [in filing a motion to suppress] and then should have determined
whether good cause or excusable neglect was shown based on the reasons given.
If no good cause or excusable neglect was established to the satisfaction of the
district court, the motion should not have been heard.
126 Idaho at 597. Idaho Criminal Rule 12(d) requires motions to suppress to be filed "within 28
days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven days before trial whichever is earlier." I.C.R.
12(d).

8

Ms. Connor's motion to suppress was filed in 2018, approximately five years after she
failed to appear for a hearing in the case in 2013.

(Supp. R., pp.40-41, 109.)

In her

memorandum in support of her motion to suppress, Ms. Connor asserted that, pursuant to State v.
Wulff, 157 Idaho 416 (2014) (holding a warrant is required for a non-consensual blood draw), her

blood was unlawfully drawn where she refused all testing and a warrant for a blood draw was
never issued. (Supp. R., p.42.) Ms. Connor sought suppression of the blood draw test results.
(Supp. R., p.42.)
The State objected to Ms. Connor's motion to suppress, asserting it was untimely filed
under I.C.R. 12(e). (Supp. R., pp.72-75.) The State claimed that Ms. Connor had not shown
good cause or excusable neglect for the late filing and asked the district court to deny the motion
to suppress because it was untimely. (Supp. R., p.74.)
A hearing was held on Ms. Connor's motion.

(Supp. R., pp.51-54; see 1/14/19 Tr.)

Defense counsel asserted that the law changed with the United States Supreme Court decision in
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 156 (2013), and the subsequent Idaho decision in State v.
Wulff, 157 Idaho 416 (2014). (1/14/19 Tr., p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.16.) Defense counsel asserted that

failure to find good cause or excusable neglect for the late filing would ignore Ms. Connor's
constitutional rights in favor of a procedural rule. (1/14/19 Tr., p.16, Ls.2-6.) Ms. Connor's
counsel asserted that the change in the law making unconstitutional her forced blood draw
excused the late-filed motion to suppress as excusable neglect and/or good cause.

(1/14/19

Tr., p.8, L.8 - p.9, L.23.) Ms. Connor's counsel agreed that, had the case proceeded to trial at
the initial trial date, the law in Idaho permitted the officers to hold Ms. Connor down to draw her
blood. (1/14/19 Tr., p.13, L.19 -p.14, L.2.) However, defense counsel asserted that Ms. Connor
was entitled to the state of the law as it is when she is before the court. (1/14/19 Tr., p.14, Ls.12-

9

15.) Counsel asked the court "to follow the dictates of the Idaho Supreme Court and find that the
blood draw was illegally obtained in violation of her constitutional rights and that the matter
should be -- should be suppressed." (1/14/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.5-9.)
After hearing the arguments of the parties, the district court found Ms. Connor's motion
to suppress was untimely filed, and no good cause or excusable neglect warranted extending the
time. (Supp. R., pp.68-74.) The district court found that Ms. Connor did not show excusable
neglect or good cause for failure to file the motion to suppression within the time set by I.C.R.
12(d). (1/14/19 Tr., p.19, Ls.22-25.) The district court found Ms. Connor voluntarily hid herself
from the authorities and concluded that her failure to attend hearings or otherwise make herself
available was not good cause or excusable neglect. (1/14/19 Tr., p.20, L.16 - p.21, L.3.) The
district court held that "the failure to be available, the failure to be at trial or for a hearing
pretrial, and being absent for the time period at issue here is not good cause nor excusable
neglect." (1/14/19 Tr., p.20, L.25 - p.21, L.3.)
Ms. Connor recognizes that there is no case law in Idaho that defines the meaning of
"good cause" or "excusable neglect" as used in I.C.R. 12(d). However, Ms. Connor asserts that
considerations that State action violated a defendant's constitutional rights do constitute good
cause to enlarge the time to hear a motion to suppress. Motions to suppress are the vehicle by
which a defendant can keep illegally obtained evidence from being used against him or her. See
I.AR. 12(b)(3). During the pendency of Ms. Connor's case, the United States Supreme Court
decided Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) and the Idaho Supreme Court decided State v.
Wulff, 157 Idaho 416 (2014).

In Missouri v. McNeely, the United States Supreme Court held that, "while the natural
dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a fmding of exigency in a specific case, ... it

10

does not do so categorically. Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is
reasonable must be determined case by case on the totality of the circumstances." 569 U.S. 141,
156 (2013). "In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a
warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of
the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so." Id. 569 U.S. at 152.
In Wulff, the Court recognized that, "McNeely repeatedly indicated that ' [w ]hether a
warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case
based on the totality of the circumstances."' Wulff, 157 Idaho at 420 (quoting McNeely). The
Wulff Court extrapolated from McNeely, reasoning that if there can be no per se exigency rule,
nor can there be a per se consent rule; it then held that any consent implied by LC. § 18-8002(1)
can be withdrawn or revoked. 157 Idaho 416, 420-23 (2014). In so holding, the Court pointed
out that such an interpretation of McNeely is consistent with prior Supreme Court precedent
holding that consent must be voluntary, and the voluntariness of consent is a factual question (to
be proved by the government), which must be analyzed under the totality of the circumstances.
See Wulff, 157 Idaho at 422 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)).
The decision in Wulff makes clear that Ms. Connor's blood was drawn in violation of her
constitutional rights. (PSI, p.150; 1/14/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.5-9.) Ms. Connor asserts that where an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing on the merits of an untimely motion to suppress can be
held, where a ruling can be issued well before trial, and where doing so addresses a clear
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, good cause has been shown. Thus, Ms. Connor
asserts the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion to enlarge time to file her
motion to suppress.

11

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten Years,
With Two And One-Half Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Connor Following Her Plea Of Guilty To
Felony DUI
Ms. Connor asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of ten years,
with two and one-half years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing
court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent
review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App.
1982). In reviewing a trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry
regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
Ms. Connor does not allege that her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its
decision by the exercise of reason, Ms. Connor must show that in light of the governing criteria,
the sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293,
294 (1997). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Ms. Connor's sentence is excessive
considering any view of the facts.

12

Ms. Connor had multiple traumatic events in her life when she made the decision to leave
the country, failing to appear for her January 15, 2013 hearing in this case. (PSI, pp.17-18.)
Ms. Connor's two youngest children had been led astray by people in the church and had
inappropriate pictures taken of them online. (PSI, p.17.) Ms. Connor's eldest son was having a
mental health emergency. (PSI, p.17.) Ms. Connor struggled to deal with these events, and
made the decision to move the family to India to leave these problems behind. (PSI, p.17.) The
rest of the family went back to the United States approximately six months after traveling to
India with Ms. Connor. (PSI, p.17.)
Ms. Connor does have a supportive family to assist her in her rehabilitation. (PSI, p.14.)
Ms. Connor has a good relationship with her adoptive mother and received a letter of support
from her. (PSI, p.14.) Ms. Connor's eldest child is also supportive of her, and assisted her
financially to come back to the United States. (PSI, p.18.) See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593,
594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the support of his family and employer
in his rehabilitation efforts).
Further, Ms. Connor expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for her actions.
(1/29/19 Tr., p.40, L.20 -p.41, L.5; 3/19/19 Tr., p.89, Ls.8-10; p.92, Ls.11-14; PSI, p.5.) During
her presentencing interview, Ms. Connor wrote that she was "ashamed at my lack of ability to
correctly perceive my physical demeanor. Irresponsible." (PSI, p.5.) At her sentencing hearing,
Ms. Connor expressed regret and told the court how sorry she was for her actions. (3/19/19
Tr., p.89, Ls.8-10; p.92, Ls.11-14.) She told the court:
For me, the whole situation and my whole life is very embarrassing. I am very
ashamed about everything.

13

So I agree - I thank Ms. Jameson as well because she could have been much
harder on me with the persistent violator and with much harder sentencing
recommendations. But I agree with her long-term of the indeterminate time
because that's going to give me a longer time to get myself in order, you know,
and I - with, hopefully, with the help of Ocean Hills. But during that time, I
know for a fact that I won't be making any violations because I always follow it
perfectly. So it will give me a longer time for me to, not just practice abstinence
from alcohol, but to actually practice recovery this time. You know, before I was
only abstaining, but now I will have a chance to learn some relapse prevention
and some recovery.
(3/19/19 Tr., p.89, Ls.8-10; p.91, Ls.8-23.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required
when a defendant expresses remorse for her conduct and accepts responsibility for her acts.
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595; State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).

Based upon the above mitigating factors, Ms. Connor asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon her. She asserts that had the district court
properly considered her considerable remorse, substance abuse issues, and her family and
community support, it would have imposed a less severe sentence.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Connor's Rule 35 Motion For A
Sentence Reduction In Light Of The New Information Offered In Support Of Her Rule 35
Motion And In Failing To Consider Additional Information Submitted On August 8, 2019, In
Support OfHer Rule 35 Motion
Although Ms. Connor contends that her sentence is excessive in light of the information
in front of the district court at the time of her March 19, 2019 sentencing hearing (see Part II,
supra), she asserts that the excessiveness of her sentence is even more apparent in light of the

new information submitted in conjunction with her Rule 35 motion. Ms. Connor asserts that the
district court's denial of her motion for a sentence modification represents an abuse of discretion.
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
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the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of
new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
Rule 35 movants wishing to submit additional evidence should introduce evidence, either
by affidavit or in the motion itself, to enable the district court to determine whether to hold an
evidentiary hearing. (See State v. Fortin, 124 Idaho 323, 328 (Ct. App. 1993.) In ruling on a
Rule 35 motion, a district court must make a "reasoned decision on whether to hold an
evidentiary hearing .... " Id. The district court abuses its discretion in determining whether to
hold a hearing on a motion for reduction of sentence without hearing testimony or oral argument
if the court unreasonably refuses to consider relevant evidence or otherwise unduly limits the
information considered. State v. Bayles, 131 Idaho 624, 626 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Izaguirre,
145 Idaho 820, 824 (Ct. App. 2008).
Ms. Connor asserts that the district court abused its discretion by unduly limiting the
information it considered when ruling upon her Rule 35 motion.

By failing to consider the

information contained in the August 8, 2019 filing submitted in support of the Rule 35 motion,
the district court unreasonably refused to consider relevant evidence and unduly limited the
information it considered.

It is likely that the information contained in the supplemental

materials filed on August 8, 2019 would have altered the decision of the district court to deny
Ms. Connor's Rule 35 motion.

15

In support of her motion for credit for time served and for a sentence reduction,
Ms. Connor filed materials contemporaneously with her motion. (Aug., pp.1-9.) She asserted
that there was a conflict in the GAIN assessment:
As highlighted in a letter dated June 10, 2019, from Correctional Case Manager
Nicholas Hale (Exhibit A - 3 pages), these inconsistencies are critical as the
District Court used the gain assessment in the reasoning for denial of probation.
The court noted the gain assessment stated Ms. Connor had "no motivation for
change."
Further, the defendant would ask the court to consider information from the IDOC
employees. (Exhibit B-D[.]) The information and documents support that
Ms. Connor is a good candidate for probation or a RIDER.
(Aug., pp.1-2.)
On August 8, 2019, Ms. Connor again submitted new or additional information in
support of her Rule 35 motion for leniency. The August 8, 2019 filing contained information
regarding her medical condition, anemia, and the fact that the condition was not improving while
she was incarcerated.

(Aug., pp.11-20.)

She submitted information regarding the self-

improvement she was engaged in while incarcerated. (Aug., pp.11-12, 17-18.) Ms. Connor
completed AA and was enrolled in Thinking for a Change and the Cognitive-Behavioral
Interventions for Substance Abuse while in custody.

(Aug., pp.11-12, 17-18.)

She also

completed a certification course for Medic First Aid-GY2015, which teaches Basic Plus CPR,
First Aid, and AED for adults. (Aug., p.17.) Ms. Connor was hired to work off-site and had
seven positive notes in her file documenting her volunteer work while incarcerated.

(Aug.,

p.17.) In support of her motion for leniency, Ms. Connor submitted documentation revealing
that she had been accepted for substance abuse treatment at a local aftercare facility. (Aug.,
pp.12, 19.)
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In denying Ms. Connor's Rule 3 5 motion, the district court said it had considered
Ms. Connor's Rule 35 motion filed on July 22, 2019, and it had considered Ms. Connor's
criminal record and her unavailability from 2012 to 2018. (Aug., pp.21, 24-25.) The court
concluded, "On the record as a whole, Defendant's request for leniency fails without any conflict
in the GAIN assessment and without regard to how certain staff at IDOC currently observed her.
(Aug., pp.24-25.) The court went on, "To the extent the alleged error in the GAIN creates an
argument that the sentence was not lawfully imposed, this Court finds such error harmless."
(Aug., p.25.) The district court denied Ms. Connor's Rule 35 motion, fmding that Ms. Connor
"has not shown an entitlement to leniency with respect to the sentence [the district court]
lawfully imposed." 7 (Aug., p.25.) The district court denied the Rule 35 motion, apparently
considering only the information filed on July 22, 2019. However, this was erroneous where
Ms. Connor filed supplemental materials on August 8, 2019.

The information Ms. Connor

submitted on August 8, 2019 in support of her Rule 35 motion was not considered by the district
court before it denied the Rule 35 motion.
In State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820 (Ct. App. 2008), the Idaho Court of Appeals
examined the question of whether a district court abused its discretion by unduly limiting the
information when ruling on a Rule 3 5 motion.

In that case, the district court denied the

defendant's motion for a neurocognitive evaluation and declined to consider articles from
professional journals on brain development that were submitted by the defendant in support of

7

The district court judge who sentenced Ms. Connor was not the same district court judge who
ruled on her Rule 35 motion. (See Aug., p.25.) It appears that the district court who denied her
Rule 35 motion believed she had been convicted of both the felony DUI and the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement. (See Aug., p.23.) This was error, as identified in footnote 6 of
this brief, Ms. Connor's plea agreement called for the prosecutor to dismiss the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement. (2/19/19 Tr., p.61, Ls.23-24.)
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his Rule 35 motion. The Idaho Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in denying the
Rule 35 motion and not ordering an evaluation because there was reason to suspect
neurocognitive abnormalities. Id. at 823. The Court also found that the district court abused its
discretion when it unduly limited the information it considered by refusing to review the articles
on which the defendant partially based his Rule 35 motion. Id. at 824. The Idaho Court of
Appeals reversed the order denying the motion for a neurocognitive evaluation, vacated the
sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. Id. at 823.
The facts of Ms. Connor's case are similar to those in Izaguirre in that the district court
did not consider the information submitted on August 8, 2019-information regarding
Ms. Connor's medical condition, her self-improvement and commendable volunteer work, and
her acceptance into a substance abuse treatment facility in the community-when it denied her
Rule 35 motion.
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district court at
the time of sentencing, it is clear that the district court abused its discretion in unduly limiting the
information it considered before ruling on Ms. Connor's Rule 35 motion. Thus, the district court
erred in failing to reduce her sentence or place her on probation pursuant to Ms. Connor's Rule
35 motion.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Connor respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment and
conviction and reverse the order which denied her motion to enlarge the time for her to file a
suppression motion and remand with instructions that Ms. Connor be allowed to file any
suppression motion deemed applicable. Alternatively, she requests that the order denying her
Rule 35 motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 25 th day ofNovember, 2019.
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